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Abstract; Since the Independence era, elections in Nigeria have been 
characterized by high scale of electoral malpractices, money politics, 
electoral violence and the use of ethno-religious divide in order to 
influence the voting patterns of the electorates. Electoral violence is 
one of the strategies employed by Nigerian politicians during 
electioneering period. Desperate and power drunk politicians often 
sponsor unemployed youths and stark illiterates to carry out assaults 
on their perceived political opponents with a view to manipulating 
election results to their own advantage. This paper shall make an in-
depth analysis of electoral violence in Nigeria with particular focus on 
the fourth republic.  
Keywords: Election, Electoral Violence, Electoral Security. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Ordinarily, electoral process is expected to contribute towards 
democratic consolidation in any given society. Through elections, the 
electorates are provided with the ample opportunity to vote for the 
candidates and parties that will represent their varying interests. 
However, in many African countries such as Nigeria, the electoral 
process has brought about unwarranted political instability. Nigeria, 
with a population of about 190 million and abundant mineral 
resources is being widely touted as one of Africa’s brightest prospects 
on the global stage. Despite Nigeria’s huge potential, the country has 
been bedeviled by series of political unrest from the first republic 
(1960-1966). Nigeria was thrown into a 30 month civil war (1967-
1970) that claimed the lives of millions. During the course of 
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Nigeria’s chequered political history, different military regimes 
governed the country (1966-1979; 1983-1999) in her fifty eight years 
of independence.  
On May 29, 1999, Nigerians heaved a sigh of relief after the military 
relinquished power to the democratically elected government led by 
Olusegun Obasanjo, an ex-military ruler. From that time, Nigeria has 
enjoyed over 18 years of democratic rule albeit, with various episodes 
of violence ranging from the Niger Delta militancy to the Boko 
Haram Insurgency in some parts of Northern Nigeria. The year 2015 
served as the turning point in Nigeria’s democracy as the main 
opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC) upstaged the 
erstwhile ruling party, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) at the general 
elections. The major thrust of this paper shall be geared towards 
analyzing both the pre-election and post-election violence at the 
2015 general polls.  
The first section is the introduction; second focuses on the theoretical 
contextualization of electoral violence; the third section deals with 
the historical account of the trends and patterns of electoral violence 
in Nigeria’s fourth republic; the fourth section is premised upon the 
Nigerian state, electoral violence and democratic consolidation, while 
the fifth part is the conclusion. 
 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION 
Elections 
Elections form the bedrock of a genuine democratic system. Osumah 
and Aghemelo (2010) see election as a process through which the 
people choose their leaders and indicate their policies and programme 
preference and consequently invest a government with authority to 
rule. Roberts and Edwards (1991) cited in Omotola (2007) view 
election as a method of selecting persons to fill certain public offices 
through choices made by the electorate; those citizens who are 
qualified to vote under the laws and procedures of the electoral 
system. Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary (2006) defines election as 
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“the act or process of organizing systematic (s) election (permitting 
mass participation and method of choosing a person or persons by 
vote for a public office position in which state authority is exercised”.  
Electoral Violence 
According to Albert (2007), electoral violence involves all forms of 
organized acts of threats aimed at intimidating, harming, 
blackmailing a political stakeholder or opponent before, during and 
after an election with an intention to determine, delay or influence a 
political process. Ogundiya and Baba (2005), see electoral violence as 
all sorts of riots, demonstrations, party clashes, political assassinations, 
looting, arson, thuggery, kidnapping spontaneous or not, which 
occur before, during and after elections. Fischer (2002) defines 
electoral violence (conflict) as any random or organized act that 
seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process 
through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, 
physical assault, forced “protection”, blackmail, destruction of 
property, or assassination.  
Similarly, Igbuzor (2010), sees electoral violence as: 
Any act of violence perpetuated in the course of political activities 
including, pre, during and post election periods, and may include any 
of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political 
meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous 
weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process or to cause 
bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral 
processes. 
The above definitions are the hallmarks of electoral violence in 
Nigeria’s fourth republic. 
Electoral Security 
Electoral Security is defined as “the process of protecting electoral 
stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media, and 
observers, electoral information and campaign materials; electoral 
facilities such as polling stations and counting centre and electoral 
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events such as campaign rallies against death, damage, or disruption 
of the electoral processes (USAID). Furthermore, Fischer (2010), 
defined electoral security as “the process of protecting electoral 
stakeholders, information, facilities or events. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
For the purpose of this discourse, this paper will rest on Karl Marx’s 
dialectical materialism which gives vivid explanations on electoral 
violence in Nigeria. Karl Marx’s dialectical materialism suits Nigeria’s 
scenario. Abbas (2010) observed that dialectical materialism is 
premised on man’s inherent motivations of economic pursuits and 
needs. Thus, man’s fierce inclinations and struggles to acquire, 
control and maintain political power at all cost justify the choice of 
this theory. Therefore, the relations between the people in the 
production processes are symbiotically connected with the nature and 
direction of the political struggles to capture political power in order 
to determine economic factors. Furthermore, this assertion was 
supported by Dudley (1965 cited in Etannibi, 2004). 
 Dudley said that: 
“The reality was that Nigerian politicians perceived politics and 
political office as investment and as an avenue for the acquisition of 
extra ordinary wealth (through corruption) which they think is not 
possible through other forms of legitimate vocation and enterprise. 
Thus, in Nigeria, the shortest cut to affluence is through politics. 
Politics means money and money means politics…to be a member of 
the government party means open avenue to government patronage, 
contract deals and the like”. 
In a country where over 70 per cent of the population lives in 
extreme poverty, politics is seen as an escape route from poverty. This 
is worsened by the high level of corruption among public office 
holders in Nigeria. Over the years, Nigerian politicians and other 
public office holders have promoted ostentatious lifestyles not been 
mindful of the sufferings of the Nigerian masses. One of Nigeria’s 
brightest political scientists, Claude Ake (1964) asserted that:”Those 
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who win state power can have all the wealth they want even without 
working, while those who lose the struggle for state power cannot 
have security in the wealth they have made even by hard work. The 
capture of state power inevitably becomes a matter of life and death. 
That is one reason why our politics is so intense, anarchic and 
violent”. 
Comparatively, it has been discovered that elected representatives of 
the people at the local, state and federal levels of government earn 
higher wages and allowances more than their counterparts in the 
developed countries. Hence, the struggle for political power through 
any means becomes inevitable in Nigeria’s political space. 
Electoral Violence Prior to 1999 
Electoral violence in Nigeria is traceable to the first republic especially 
during the 1964/65 elections. The dominant political parties in the 
first republic, namely; the Action Group (AG), the Northern People’s 
Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons 
(NCNC) were ethnically based parties that wanted to maintain the 
wide followership they enjoyed from the regions were they emerged. 
AG was essentially the party for the Yoruba race, NCNC was regarded 
as Ibo party, while NPC was predominantly an Hausa/Fulani party. 
During the 1964/65 elections, politicians were involved in wide scale 
murder, kidnapping and arson. Also, there were gross irregularities in 
the conduct of the elections that precipitated the military to stage a 
coup that ended Nigeria’s first democratic experiment.   
Electoral violence reared its ugly head again during the highly 
controversial 1983 general elections. The elections were massively 
rigged for instance, in the then Oyo and Ondo states, the two Unity 
Party of Nigeria (UPN) controlled states were declared for the ruling 
National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The announcement led to the 
outbreak of violence (Babarinsa, 2002). The scandalous 1983 
elections caused general apathy among Nigerians. It was not 
surprising when the military intervened by ousting President Shehu 
Shagari on December 31, 1983.  
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The June 12, 1993 election organized by then Military President, 
General Ibrahim Babangida was expected to break the jinx of Nigeria’s 
chequered political history. The campaign strategies; government’s 
support, the enthusiasm of registered voters and the generality of 
Nigerians towards June 12, 1993 are yet to be surpassed. The election 
was supposed to put an end to the eventful regime of General 
Ibrahim Babangida and usher in a democratically elected government 
(Olowojolu, 2015). Two political parties were created namely, Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention 
(NRC). The June 12, 1993 was unique in the sense that the two 
political parties fielded two muslim candidates in the person of highly 
influential billionaire MKO Abiola and the affable Bashir Tofa. MKO 
Abiola, a Yoruba from Western Nigeria was the Presidential flag 
bearer for SDP while, Bashir Tofa, a native of old Northern city, Kano 
was the Presidential candidate of NRC (Olowojolu, 2015). Despite 
the choice of SDP in picking Alhaji Babagana Kingibe as running 
mate, Nigerians did not raise eyebrows on the muslim-muslim ticket 
of SDP. On the other hand, NRC picked Sylvester Ugoh, a Christian 
from Eastern Nigeria as Tofa’s running mate. Throughout the 
electioneering period, religious and ethnic affiliations did not 
influence voting patterns of Nigerians. June 12, 1993 election widely 
believed to have been won by MKO Abiola remains the freest and 
fairest election in Nigeria’s history. The hopes of many Nigerians 
were dashed when the military government annulled the presidential 
election. Shortly afterwards, nationwide protests, industrial strike 
action and civil disobedience engulfed the country. The post June 12 
crisis led military ruler, General Babangida to abdicate his exalted 
position as head of state on August 27, 1993. General Babaginda 
hurriedly relinquished power to an unpopular Interim National 
Government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan (Olowojolu, 
2015). 
The Interim National Government was sacked by General Sani 
Abacha on November 17, 1993. In 1994, General Abacha arrested the 
acclaimed winner of June 12, 1993 election, MKO Abiola on the 
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account of treason as Abiola declared himself the president elect. 
Abacha’s authoritarian regime expired when the head of state died on 
June 8, 1998 under controversial circumstances. On June 7 1998, 
MKO Abiola died on what was supposed to be his date of release. The 
newly appointed military ruler, General Abdulsalami Abubakar 
promised to return Nigeria to civilian rule in 1999 (Olowojolu, 
2015). Eventually, the military regime ushered in Nigeria into the 
fourth republic. On May 29, 1999, ex-military ruler, Chief Olusegun 
Obasanjo was sworn in as the President of Nigeria. It marked the 
beginning of a new era in Nigeria’s history. 
Trends and Patterns of Electoral Violence in the Fourth Republic 
Nigeria’s fourth republic has witnessed the conduct of general 
elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 respectively. These 
elections have been deeply enmeshed in series of violence before, 
during and after the elections. The 1999 elections had minimal record 
of violence largely because the military supervised the electoral 
process that birthed the fourth republic. 
The 2003 elections were conducted by President Olusegun 
Obasanjo’s administration who was seeking his second tenure. The 
2003 elections were characterized by manipulation, rigging, thuggery 
and the assassination of perceived political opponents. The ruling 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) swept the polls as it consolidated its 
hold on the Nigerian political landscape.  After the completion of 
two terms as President, Obasanjo’s administration conducted perhaps 
the worst election in Nigeria’s history. Prior to the 2007 elections, 
the outgoing President Obasanjo asserted that the election was going 
to be a “do-or-die” for the ruling PDP. Animashaun (2008), argued 
that there were massive irregularities in the 2007 elections and it was 
characterized by inflation of voting figures, declaration of results 
where elections were never held or not conclusive, intimidation of 
voters as well as manipulation of the security services. Results of 
elections conducted in some were totally different from those 
announced in Abuja contrary to the provisions of the 2006 Electoral 
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Act (TMG, 2007). The Human Rights Watch (2007) noted that 
there were scores of political killings, bombings and armed clashes 
between rival political groups. The outcome of the 2007 elections 
generated a lot of controversies and wide spread condemnation from 
both the local and international observers. The winner of the 
presidential election, late Umaru Musa Yaradua admitted that the 
electoral process in 2007 was highly fraudulent. Shortly after 
assuming office as the Executive President, Yaradua instituted an 
Electoral Reform Committee headed by Justice Uwais with a view 
towards correcting the ills in Nigeria’s electoral system. Some of the 
recommendations of the Electoral Reform Committee were included 
in the amended Electoral Act. It is also on record that Yaradua’s 
administration promoted non-interference in the judiciary. This was 
evident in the various judgements dispensed at both the Tribunal and 
Appeal courts over electoral disputes. Gubernatorial elections in 
states such as Ekiti, Osun, Edo and Ondo that were initially declared 
to have been won by PDP were upturned in favour of Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and Labour Party (LP) respectively 
(Aniekwe, et al, 2011).  
The 2011 general elections were adjudged by many observers as the 
most credible election organized by the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) since 1999. For example, Terence 
McCulley, U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria praised the National Assembly 
election as the first-ever ‘credible, transparent, free and fair general 
election’ in Nigeria, and declared that it provided a ‘historic 
opportunity for Nigeria to consolidate its democracy and further 
expand its voice on the world stage’ (Agbambu and Ajayi, 2011). In 
the same vein, EU Election Observation Mission to Nigeria said ‘the 
2011 general elections marked an important step towards 
strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain’ 
(EU EOM, 2011). 
Prior to the presidential polls, some Northern politicians including 
Adamu Ciroma, Iyorchia Ayu, Lawal Kaita, Bello Kirfi, Yahaya 
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Kwande, and Bashir Yusuf Ibrahim wrote a letter to the PDP National 
Chairman on 17 September 2010 requesting the  party leadership to 
restrain President Goodluck Jonathan from contesting the 2011 
elections under the party’s platform. The group argued that eight-
year, two-term presidency ceded to the North in line with the PDP, 
which began with former President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua in 2007, 
must continue through another Northerner following Yar’Adua’s 
death. The group warned that the failure of the ruling PDP to apply 
the principle of zoning would threaten the stability of Nigeria, saying; 
‘we are extremely worried that our party’s failure to deliver justice in 
this matter (power-shift to the North) may ignite a series of events, 
the scope of magnitude of which we can neither proximate nor 
contain’ (Abdallah, 2010, Obia, 2010). Inflammatory messages sent 
through the social media worsened the tensions created by religious 
and ethnic campaigning by supporters of President Jonathan and 
Muhammudu Buhari (Harwood and Campbell, 2010). 
Figure 1.0 2011 Presidential Election in Nigeria 
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The Northern states of the country were thrown into chaos and 
anarchy after Dr. Goodluck Jonathan was declared the winner of the 
2011 presidential election. Human Rights Watch (2011) reported that 
about 800 lives were lost as a result of the post election violence. 
Similarly, the Human Rights Watch (2011) claimed that more than 
65,000 people were displaced after the 2011 post election violence. 
The Nigerian Red Cross Society released a slightly lower figure 
indicating that the violence displaced 48,000 persons in 12 states 
(Omenazu and Paschal, 2011).  
In the run up to the 2015 elections, the security challenges had 
become worrisome most especially in Northern Nigeria and Abuja 
the Federal Capital Territory. This is largely due to the meteoric rise in 
the Boko Haram Insurgency. The CLEEN Foundation Security Threat 
Assessment published in March 2015 found that 15 states were on red 
alert level. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in its 
Pre-Election Report stated that at least 58 persons have been killed 
even before the conduct of 2015 general elections (CLEEN, 2015). 
There were changes in the political configuration of the country as 
could be seen in the formation of a mega opposition party, the All 
Progressives Congress (APC). Formed in 2013, APC was the 
amalgamation of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC); the 
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN); the All Nigeria People’s Party 
(ANPP) and a faction of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). 
Former military ruler, General Muhammudu Buhari (retd) was picked 
as the presidential flag bearer for APC. On the other hand, the PDP 
which has dominated Nigeria’s political space since 1999 chose the 
incumbent president, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan as the presidential 
candidate. Prior to the 2015 polls, PDP suffered setbacks due to the 
mass exodus of key political players to APC. Jonathan who hails from 
the Ijaw ethnic group in the South-South region was perceived as the 
candidate of the South East and South-South of Nigeria. 
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New measures were introduced with the view towards curbing 
electoral fraud and electoral violence during the 2015 general 
elections.  
The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) under the 
leadership of Prof Attahiru Jega introduced the use of Card Readers 
and Permanent Voters Card (PVC) for the upcoming 2015 general 
elections. The technology of the Card Reader system has ensured 
credible elections in Ghana, Kenya and Sierra Leone (Vanguard, 
February 25, 2015). According to INEC, there were 66 reports of 
violent incidence all across the country. The violence were recorded 
in Rivers State (16 incidents); Ondo (8); Cross Rivers (6); Ebonyi (6); 
Akwa Ibom (5); Bayelsa (4); Lagos and Kaduna (3 each); Jigawa, 
Enugu, Ekiti (2 each); Katsina, Kogi, Plateau, Abia, Imo, Kano and 
Ogun (one each) (Vanguard, April 12, 2015). The European Union 
Election Observation Mission reported that about 30 people were 
killed on April 11, 2015 Election Day as a result of inter-party clashes 
and attacks on election sites (EU EOM, 2015). 
The roles of some stakeholders and the international community in 
ensuring a peaceful election cannot be overemphasized. A former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi appealed to the 
major contestants of the presidential election to sign a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) that will commit them to control their 
supporters against violence after the 2015 general elections (Punch, 
December 22, 2014). Similarly, the National Peace Committee for 
the 2015 General Elections led by former military ruler, General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar (retd) facilitated peace accord between 
General Buhari (retd) and President Jonathan (Punch, March 26, 
2015). Concerned that Nigeria could burst into flames, America’s 
Secretary of State, John Kerry flew to Lagos to discuss about the 2015 
elections with President Jonathan and General Buhari (retd) 
respectively (Gordon, 2015). 
Overall, the 2015 general elections were adjudged to be quite 
successful and more credible than every other election since the 
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commencement of the fourth republic. The APC made history at the 
2015 polls by becoming the first opposition party to defeat the ruling 
party in Nigeria. Thus, former military dictator, Gen. Muhammudu 
Buhari (retd) who had previously contested for the presidency in 
2003, 2007 and 2011 upstaged the incumbent president, Dr. 
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan.  
The finest hour during the general polls was the noble character 
displayed by erstwhile President Jonathan when he accepted his defeat 
and ensured a smooth transition process that ushered in Buhari’s 
administration on May 29, 2015.  
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Indeed, the 2015 general elections re-ignited the hopes of many 
Nigerians who believe in the enormous potential of the country as a 
leader in Africa. In order to ensure to institutionalize true democracy 
in Nigeria, the paper has come up with recommendations.  
Firstly, government at all levels should ensure that electoral offenders 
before, during and after the elections are arrested and made to face 
the court of law. This will serve as deterrence to the financiers and 
foot soldiers that use violence to promote their political objectives.  
Secondly, Nigeria must improve on its existing security apparatuses in 
order to combat the dynamic and sophisticated 21st century security 
challenges. Recruitment of security personnel ought to be based on 
merit. Government should ensure that the funds made available to 
the security agencies are judiciously utilized for the acquisition of 
skills and the procurement of up to date equipment.  
Thirdly, the Government should form a platform that will 
accommodate all stakeholders such as the politicians, the media, civil 
society organizations and religious institutions at the local, state and 
national levels in order to sensitize and re-orientate Nigerians on 
peaceful co-existence and the consequences of electoral violence. This 
enlightenment programme should be sustained in order to help 
Nigerians inculcate democratic norms and values. 
  
Journal of Social Sciences and Public Policy, Volume 11, Number 1, 2019. 
49 
 
Furthermore, the fight against corruption, which has eaten deep into 
the fabrics of the Nigerian society, should be given top priority by 
successive governments in Nigeria. As long as public office holders 
and their acolytes continue to live in stupendous wealth, political 
violence will remain a central feature of Nigerian politics.  Again, it is 
high time successive governments in Nigeria invested in rapid socio-
economic transformation through diversification of the economy, 
increase in foreign direct investment and proper management of the 
vast wealth of the country. Once Nigeria can attain appreciable 
economic development, the struggle for political power will 
experience a sharp decline. 
In conclusion, this paper has attempted to review the trends in 
electoral violence in Nigeria. It identified the economic interests of 
politicians as the major force behind electoral violence using 
Dialectical Materialism as its theoretical standpoint. The outcome of 
the 2015 polls in Nigeria is considered as the beginning of a new 
chapter in Nigeria. Nigeria only needs to build on the good legacies 
left behind by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s administration and INEC 
under the chairmanship of Prof. Attahiru Jega for a brighter future.  
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